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Laura Candiotto1 
Preface. 
The inner desire for the understanding 
 
 
Curiosity, inquisitiveness, wonder, intellectual courage, grit, and per-
severance are some of the emotions and dispositions that we experi-
ence in conjunction with epistemic processes such as inquiring, learn-
ing, remembering, and understanding. These states, which have been 
called “epistemic emotions”, seem to have a causal and perhaps con-
ceptual connection with knowledge and various processes related to 
knowing. In addition, some dispositions, such as love of truth or re-
spect for good arguments, seem to be part of a desirable epistemic 
character. 
The aim of this monographic issue is to investigate the epistemic 
role of these emotions, affective experiences, and dispositions. This 
means discussing ongoing approaches to the role of emotions in ra-
tional processes and dispositions, as well as drawing connections be-
tween affective experiences, rationality, and cognition. This emerging 
line of investigation is ripe for renewed research because, until re-
cently, few works have been dedicated to the topic, and even the ex-
istence of such kind of emotions is still controversial in the contem-
porary debate.  
Neuroscientists have recently discovered the integrated function-
ality between emotions and cognition. Many of them now under-
stand emotions as a constitutive element of human rationality; rather 
than framing emotions in opposition to rationality, these researchers 
argue that emotions ground the creation of concepts, facilitate delib-
eration, and partake in the various cognitive processes.  
Meanwhile, the topic of emotions has caught the attention of phi-
losophers in various subfields – not only because it addresses im-
portant questions for current debates in epistemology, philosophy of 
mind, and cognitive science, but also because the affective dimension 
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of knowledge seems to be at the ground of the same practice of phi-
losophy. For the Greeks, philosophy meant the “love of wisdom” (phi-
lo-sophia), as this affective disposition towards knowledge that gen-
erates an interest in understanding and in the methods to attain it. 
This meaning of philosophy as an inner desire for understanding has 
disseminated through the history of the ideas, and it is recognizable 
in, for example, the works of very philosophers as different as Plato, 
Augustine, Avicenna, Baruch Spinoza, Blaise Pascal, Max Scheler, and 
María Zambrano, only to name a few. 
 This monographic issue comprises ten essays, five in English and 
five in Italian. 
The notion of “epistemic emotions” is addressed in Laura Candiot-
to’s essay, Epistemic emotions. The building blocks of intellectual vir-
tues, through a deep and engaging discussion of Adam Morton’s ac-
count. Candiotto frames her thesis within virtue epistemology, de-
picting the process that leads from epistemic emotions to intellectual 
virtues, and from them to affective abilities. For the author, in fact, 
epistemic emotions are building blocks of intellectual virtues, as their 
motivational and transformative components, leading to the moral 
enhancement of the agent as a responsible epistemic agent. 
The attitudinal theory of emotions has been chosen by Silvia Vac-
carezza as the framework for understanding the epistemic role of 
moral emotion. In her precise and clear essay, A guide to moral 
knowledge. The epistemic role of moral emotions, Vaccarezza argues 
for the objective status of the evaluative properties disclosed by 
moral emotions. A list of epistemic moral emotions is provided, dis-
closing new paths of investigation into this intriguing field at the in-
tersection of epistemology and ethics. 
Michael Brady’s paper, Social cognition of negative emotions, 
brings the discussion into the social dimensions of cognition, analyz-
ing the epistemic value of negative emotions. Negative emotions are 
in fact the main focus of his insightful inquiry into the nature of suf-
fering and its value. In order to explain emotional suffering, Brady 
analyses in detail bodily suffering. In so doing, he discloses the signifi-
cance of studying the bodily experience of emotional states – in par-
ticular facial expression of pain and suffering – for properly under-
standing the social and epistemic value of recognising the other’s suf-
fering. 
In Twenty-first century perspectivism. The role of emotions in sci-
entific inquiry, Mark Alfano addresses the topic from the point of view 
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of scientific practice, arguing that some or all emotions are required, 
or at least recommended, in scientific inquiry. In his enthusiastic an-
swer, Alfano depicts the scientific attitude as emotion-motivated in-
quiry, taking those geniuses who have achieved many of the most 
significant scientific advances to be motivated by their emotions as 
exemplary scientists. 
The essay Michael Polanyi and the roles of emotion in natural sci-
ence by Richard Allen gives us a hint into the epistemic role of the 
emotions for scientific inquiry, through an analysis of the life and 
thoughts of Michael Polanyi. The scientist distinguished three func-
tions of emotion in science, the selective, the heuristic, and the per-
suasive. Analysing these functions, Allen explains why they sustain 
the effort of discovery, arguing for the essential role of emotions for 
scientific inquiry. 
While positive emotions urge us to seek answers to our scientific 
questions, a certain level of dissatisfaction seems to be required to 
urge the agent to seek a deeper understanding. The elegant essay 
Domande scientifiche e pulsione mistica. Wittgenstein, Freud e Lacan 
al di là del principio di piacere (Scientific questions and mystic drive. 
Wittgenstein, Freud and Lacan beyond the principle of pleasure) by 
Stefano Oliva analyses this kind of epistemic dissatisfaction through 
an engaging comparison with the psychoanalytic concept of “drive”. 
The essay brings the readers through an analysis that moves from 
Ludwig Wittgenstein to Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. 
Also Luca Marchetti’s paper, L’anticipazione cognitiva delle emo-
zioni. Reazioni primitive e grammatica nella riflessione di Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (Emotions’ cognitive anticipation. Primitive reactions 
and grammatics in Wittgenstein) focuses on Wittgenstein’s thought, 
but his analysis is dedicated to the discussion of the expressivist theo-
ry of emotions. In his skillful and precise analysis of some sections of 
the Remarks on the philosophy of psychology, Marchetti describes 
Wittgenstein’s criticism of the reduction of emotions both to bodily 
feelings and to behaviors. The author argues that the value of emo-
tions does not reside in a causal role towards knowledge, but that 
they function as attentional patterns for a possible knowledge. 
In Sulle emozioni epistemiche. Una prospettiva estetica e un’ese-
gesi genealogica attraverso le Confessiones di Agostino nella lettura 
di Martin Heidegger (On epistemic emotions. An aesthetic perspective 
and genealogy exegesis through Heidegger’s reading of Augustine 
Confessiones), Erasmo Silvio Storace invites the reader to follow 
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Heidegger’s lectures on Augustine to grasp the epistemic value of 
certain emotions as fear and hope. His refined analysis discloses a 
meaning of epistemic emotions at the intersection between cognition 
and volition, ascribing to this relation the function to lead the subject 
to action.  
Alfonso Di Prospero, in his essay Conoscenza, emozioni e struttura 
dell’intersoggettività. Riflessioni sulla figura del servo e del signore in 
Hegel (Knowledge, emotions and structure of intersubjectivity. Reflec-
tions on Hegel’s master-slave dialectics), introduces the important 
topic of the relation between knowledge and power, and specifically 
between knowledge and fear, through an anthropological interpreta-
tion of Hegel’s though. Fear is understood as an intersubjective prop-
erty, and the intriguing and insightful references to Bateson’s system 
theory provides the paper with a very original taste.  
The monographic issue ends with Chiara Dolce’s essay, Lacrime 
universali, lacrime culturali: il pianto come privilegio dell’essere uomini 
(Universal tears, cultural tears. Tears as a privilege of being humans). 
Using both the instruments that derives from philosophical anthro-
pology and cultural anthropology, Dolce discloses the epistemic value 
of crying, as a human privilege to make moral choices beyond anima-
lity. 
The authors whose contributions appear in this volume approach 
the topic from different perspectives. To some the topic reveals im-
portant aspects about the subjective dimension embedded in the 
practice of knowledge; for others the topic discloses intriguing per-
spectives on the capacities of our minds, or into the abilities required 
for knowing. Some are bent on finding connections between this top-
ic and other fields, such as ethics, anthropology, education, and sci-
ence; others find inspiration from the way this topic is questioned in 
the history of philosophy. This plurality of perspectives is welcome, 
not only because it provides evidence of the fertility of the topic, but 
also because it opens up new lines of investigation. In particular, I 
think that one of the innovative topics that is recognizable in many of 
these collected essays is that we should also study those emotions 
that do not immediately seem to have an epistemic value, mostly be-
cause they are negative emotions connected to certain levels of suf-
fering. Our auspice is, thus, that this monographic issue may act as a 
stimulus for pursuing new research in this intriguing topic that asks us 
to re-consider the taxonomy of positive and negative emotions in re-
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lation to the practice of knowing, broadening the list of epistemic 
emotions. 
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